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COMMENT
A PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF THE PARENTAL
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The law is a human institution fashioned not by some superior
being, but by the mind of man, and intended to serve human needs.
Such being its nature, it can always be changed in order to adapt
it to the service of justice. The development of the common law
is the story of the constant efforts of the courts to find principles
applicable to specific cases, only to discover later that the principle
applied yesterday in a case, if applied today in the instant case,
will produce injustice.1
In a recent New York case, Badigan v. Badigan, a mother of a
three-year-old child brought an action against the child's father for
negligently injuring the infant. The father allegedly left the family
automobile unlocked in a parking lot; the child released the brake and
was injured in his attempt to escape from the auto. Defendant's
motion for summary judgment was sustained by the trial court, and
the holding was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. The
court's decision was based upon the settled rule "that an unemanci-
pated minor child has no right of action against his parents for non-
willful injuries."3 In the 1957 case of Parks v. Parks,4 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that a minor child could not recover dam-
ages for injuries sustained because of his mother's negligent operation
of the family automobile. The court reached this decision while ad-
mitting that the injuries did not result from an exercise of parental
discipline or control or in the conduct of the domestic establishment.
The injuries caused the child to be confined in a state institution, and
it was thought that the confinement would be permanent. It was also
acknowledged that liability insurance would have covered the judg-
ment. Nevertheless, the court followed the parental immunity rule
and declared that the doctrine is:
[A] rule based on the sound principle of public policy to pro-
mote family unity and avoid family discord and disturbance, it pre-
vents possible collusive action between parent and child in situations
where the liability of either parent or child is covered by insurance.5
1 Rossman, J., concurring in Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 302, 218 P.2d 445,
453 (1950).
2 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718 (1961).
3 Id. at 473, 174 NE.2d 719.
4 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957). See also Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163
A.2d 147 (1960).
5 Id. at 296, 135 A.2d 71.
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Thus, the child in each of these cases was exposed to the danger of
not receiving proper medical treatment for his injuries and living the
rest of his life with a handicap. The purpose of this comment is to
examine this rule of parental immunity and to suggest a different ap-
proach in those cases where a minor child is injured because of his
parent's negligence in operating an automobile.
ORIGIN OF THE PARENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Without citing authority, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Hew-
ellete v. George,' decided in 1891, held that:
The peace of society, and of families composing society, and
a sound public policy.., forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal
injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.7
The court disallowed the claim of a minor daughter, who was separated
from her husband, against her mother for falsely imprisoning her in
an insane asylum. The court assumed that an infant could not main-
tain a personal injury action against his parent at common law, but
later authorities dispute this premise.8 There is confusion on this
point because there were no English cases deciding this question.
Thus, one can argue that there was no such cause of action at common
law because there was no case sustaining the child's cause of action.
However, by relying on the same fact, one could reach the opposite
conclusion, and the English courts did permit a minor child's cause of
action against his parents where the suit concerned the child's prop-
erty rights.'" Furthermore, "the English text-writers of the nineteenth
century appear to have been unanimous in the opinion that a child
might have a cause of action for an assault committed by the father."-"
Thus, the Mississippi court based its opinion upon a disputed assump-
tion at best. Of even greater import is the fact that the court failed
to take account of the conflicting policies involved. That public policy
which guarantees a remedy to every man for a wrong done him squarely
collides with the policy of preserving family harmony and discipline.
By considering only the latter and ignoring the former, the court failed
6 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
7 Id. at 711, 9 So. 887.
8 Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H.
352, 150 At. 905 (1930) ; Prosser, Torts § 101 (2d ed. 1955).
9 See Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Materese v. Materese,
47 R.I. 131,131 At. 198 (1925).
1o Roberts v. Roberts, Hadres 96; Duke of Beaufort v. Berty, 1 P. Wins. 705; Mor-
gan v. Morgan, 1 Atk. 489.
11 Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 8, at 357, 150 At. 907.
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to reach a reasoned decision which would strike a balance between
these two important policies. It is apparent that in this case there was
no family harmony to preserve, and the problem of parental discipline
was not present because the child was married.
Despite the shortcomings of the Mississippi decision, its reason-
ing was followed in the next two cases on the subject. In McKelvery
v. McKelvery2 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a minor child
could not recover civil damages from his father and stepmother for
the infliction of cruel and inhuman treatment. The rule reached the
height of its application when the Washington Supreme Court in Roller
v. Roller 13 held that a teen-age daughter could not recover damages
from her father who had raped her. The court realized that there was
good reason for not applying the rule in this situation, but it asserted
that:
Courts, in determining their jurisdiction or want of jurisdiction,
rely upon certain uniform principles of law, and, if it be once
established that a child has a right to sue a parent for a tort, there
is no practical line of demarkation which can be drawn, for the
same principle which would allow the action in the case of a heinous
crime, like the one involved in this case, would allow an action to
be brought for any other tort.14
Thus, the court applied a rule designed to protect domestic harmony
in a case where the tranquility of the family home was disrupted
beyond repair. Despite the results of these early cases, the rule of
parental immunity survives. The rule is followed in all cases where
parental negligence results in harm to the minor child whether such
negligence results from operation of the family automobile15 or not.16
Nevertheless, the courts, having discovered the fallibility of this inflex-
ible rule, have chipped away at the rule's foundation by engrafting
various exceptions.
12 11 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); see also, Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994,
124 S.W.2d 675 (1939).
13 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905), overruled by Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 242
251 P.2d 149 (1952).
14 Id. at 244, 79 Pac. 789.
15 Owens v. Auto. Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Rambo v.
Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145
AtI. 753 (1929); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Luster v.
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Badigan v. Badigan, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174
N.E.2d 718 (1961); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Cohen v.
Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N.E. 277 (1932); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65
(1957); Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194
Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953); Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931);
Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wisc.2d 44, 93 N.W.2d 867 (1959).
10 Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955);
Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE PARENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The first break with the parental immunity doctrine came in 1930
with the New Hampshire case of Dunlap v. Dunlap.:" In that case
the injured child was employed by his father, a contractor, and was
injured in the course of his employment. The New Hampshire Su-
preme Court escaped the dogma of the parental immunity rule by
holding that the parent had surrendered his parental control by hiring
the child and assuming the master-servant relationship. The court
felt that the presence of employer's liability insurance removed the
danger that family discord would result from the maintenance of the
suit. Thus, the court reasoned that the parental privilege exists only
when maintenance of the suit would disturb the parent-child relation-
ship.
In the case of Lusk v. Lusk,' the West Virginia Supreme Court
permitted a minor child, injured while riding on her father's school
bus, to recover damages from the parent who was required to carry
liability insurance by state law. The Virginia Supreme Court, when
confronted with a similar situation in Worrell v. Worrell,'9 held that
the infant could recover from the parent, a common carrier, because
the presence of compulsory insurance did away with the reason for
the parental immunity rule. The Ohio Supreme Court followed this
trend in Signs v. Signs"0 by holding that a parent in his business or
vocational capacity is not immune from a personal tort action by his
unemancipated minor child. In that case the parent was a member of
a partnership, and the accident occurred upon partnership property.
The court emphasized the fact that a child is permitted to sue his
parents if protecting his property rights but not his personal rights
under the general rule.2 ' It should be noted that the facts upon which
the courts base this exception are similar to the situation which occurs
when the parent injures his child while operating an automobile.
17 Supra note 8.
8 112 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
19 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939). See also Borst v. Borst, supra note 13.
20 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 748 (1952); But see Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N.Y.
445, 198 N.E. 23 (1935); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
21 Id. at 575, 103 N.E.2d 748, "It seems absurd to say that it is legal and proper
for an unemancipated child to bring an action against his parents concerning the child's
property rights yet to be utterly without redress with reference to injury to his person.
It is difficult to understand by what legerdemain of reason, logic or law such a situation
can exist or how it can be said that domestic harmony would be undisturbed in one
case and be upset in the other." Nevertheless, the Sign's child did not recover because
the parents had previously warned him to stay away from the gasoline pumps on the
partnership property; therefore, it was held that he was in the same position as a
trespasser. Signs v. Signs, 161 Ohio St. 241, 118 N.E.2d 411 (1954).
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A further exception to the rule of parental privilege has been
made in cases where the parent has committed tortious conduct so
flagrant as to be classified intentional or willful.22 The courts have
reasoned that the parent's acts have either terminated the parent-child
relationship or exceeded its bounds,23 or that the peace of the home
has already been disturbed beyond repair.2 ' This exception permits
the courts to escape such unreasonable results as those reached in the
earlier cases.
In the area of vicarious liability, the older cases held that the
parent's employer was not liable to the child injured by his parent's
negligent conduct while he was within the scope of his employment.2
These early cases reasoned that it was impossible to hold the master
liable for the servant's tort when the servant could not be held liable,
and that if recovery were allowed, the master's right of indemnity
,would shift the loss to the parent and, thus, defeat the purpose of the
parental immunity rule. However, the courts came to realize that
there is no reason to include the master within the family privilege
because such inclusion does not foster the aims of the parental privi-
lege. Also, the employer's right of indemnity against his employee is
based upon the employee's duty to care for his employer's interests,
and the right of recovery is not a continuation of the original claim
against the employer. Therefore, the majority of jurisdictions have
made another exception to the immunity rule and hold that the injured
child may recover from the master even though the servant may be
immune from suit 6 The courts have also applied this more modern
reasoning to hold an automobile owner who allows a parent to use his
car liable to the borrower's child for injuries caused by the parent's
negligence, 7 and it has been held that a child may maintain an action
22 Wright v. Wright, supra note 15; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Il.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d
525 (1956); Mahnke v. More, supra note 8; Siembab v. Siembab, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82, 202
Misc. 1953 (1952); Cowgill v. Boock, supra note 1.
23 Wright v. Wright, ibid. The court said that what particular acts are necessary
to divest custody and bring about loss of parental control is a question of fact, and
that these are the acts for which the child may sue.
24 Mahnke v. More, supra note 8.
25 Myers v. Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App.2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938); Maine
v. James Maine and Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924); Sacknoff v. Sacknoff,
131 Me. 280, 161 At. 669 (1932); Emerson v. Western Seed and Irr. Co., 116 Neb. 180,
216 N.W. 297 (1927).
26 Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938); Wright v.
Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948); Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co.,
249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928); Hudson v. Gas Consumer's Ass'n, 123 N.J.L. 252, 8
A.2d 337 (1939) ; Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 AUt. 792 (1935) ; Pittsley v. David,
298 Mass. 552, 11 N.E.2d 461 (1937); Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111
Conn. 377, 150 At. 107 (1930).
27 Broaddus v. Wilkinson, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W.2d 1052 (1940); Miller v. J. A.
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against a corporation in which his parents own one-half of the shares.2"
A child may maintain an action against his parents for a tort
committed after emancipation 9 or after the child has reached ma-
jority.3 The emancipation occurs when the parent has surrendered
his right to the child's earnings and services and his parental control.
This exception apparently assumes that the goal of domestic tran-
quility ends when the child becomes emancipated or reaches majority,
and that after this time, the child no longer owes a duty of respect to
his parent. Thus, it would seem that if the parental immunity rule
does in fact promote domestic peace and respect for parents, this dis-
tinction between dependent and independent children should not be
made. Nevertheless, this distinction was recognized in the early cases.
The majority of jurisdictions permit recovery in those cases where
a child brings an action against one who stands in place of the parent,
i.e., a relative who has custody of the child.31 These cases contradict
the reasons given for the immunity rule because the person standing
in loco parentis takes the role of the parent in all respects, and it would
appear that the argument of domestic tranquility would apply in these
cases. Thus, the courts seem quite willing to circumvent the rule of
parental immunity on the basis of an inapplicable distinction in facts.
Indeed, it seems true that "outmoded legal doctrines are rarely over-
turned abruptly for courts seem to prefer to erode them gradually by
differentiation, exception and ultimately extinction."3 It has also been
held that a twelve-year-old brother may recover from his sixteen-year-
old sister in a personal injury action when the injury resulted from the
sister's negligence in driving an automobile covered by liability in-
Tyrholm and Co., 196 Minn. 438, 265 N.W. 324 (1936); LeSage v. LeSage, 224 Wisc.
57, 271 N.W. 369 (1937). Contra, Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N.W. 290 (1927);
Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952).
28 Foy v. Foy Elec. Co., 231 N.C. 161, 56 S.E.2d 418 (1949).
29 Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948); Groh v. IV. A. Krahm, 223
Wisc. 662, 271 N.W. 374 (1937).
30 Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S.E. 278 (1930); Crosby v. Crosby, 230
App. Div. 651, 246 N.Y.S. 384 (1931); Ponder v. Ponder, 157 So. 627 (La. App. 1934).
But, when the tort is committed during minority, the child may not maintain an action
after reaching majority. Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); London
Guarantee and Acc. Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 78 (1954). Whether the
child is emancipated is a question of fact for the jury. Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 94
S.E.2d 12 (1956); Glover v. Glover, 319 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. App. 1958).
81 Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939); Treschman v. Treschman,
28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wisc. 266, 206 N.V. 173
(1925); Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913). Contra, Trudell v.
Leatherly, 212 Cal. 678, 300 Pac. 7 (1931); Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177
S.E. 828 (1934); Fertenberry v. Holmes, 89 Miss. 373, 42 So. 799 (1907).
32 Jacobs, 3.. dissenting in Hastings v. Hastings, supra note 15, at 261, 163 A.2d 155.
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surance1 3 Here again, it appears that the arguments of collusion and
damage to domestic tranquility would be as appropriate as in the
child-parent cases, but the court chose to hold otherwise.
Another strange application of the parental immunity doctrine
occurs in those cases where the child brings a personal injury action
against his parent's estate. Although the parent-child relationship has
been terminated and the domestic tranquility argument is no longer
applicable, the child may not maintain his action.3 However, when
the child is deceased, it has been held that the wrongful death acts
permit the child's administrator to recover damages for the death of
the infant from the parent. 5 Thus, where the parent-child relationship
is terminated, recovery may be had in the one instance but not the
other. The logic of these decisions is indeed difficult to understand
because the usual arguments of family peace and parental discipline
are not applicable in either situation
When one leaves the tort area, it becomes apparent that this
parental immunity doctrine is indeed an anomaly. The common law
has always permitted actions in favor of the minor with respect to
the parent's dealings with the infant's property." Indeed, it would
appear that child-parent suits are permitted in all areas of the law
other than tort.3 7 Surely one cannot take the position that property
actions between parent and child do not affect the family relationship
but that personal injury actions would be harmful to the relation-
ship. Evidently, the law is quite willing to protect the property rights
of a child but not his personal right to be free from negligent in-
vasion. It can truly be said of the parental immunity rule that "few
topics in the law of torts, in view of modern economic, social and
legislative change, display in their treatment greater inconsistency and
more unsatisfactory reasoning." 38
33 Rozell v. Rozell, 256 App. Div. 61, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939). See also Munsert v.
Farmers Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 229 Wisc. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938).
34 Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Harralson V. Thomas, 269
S.W.2d 276 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954); Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N.J. Misc. 849, 143 Ati. 3
(1928), both parent and child were dead.
35 Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.V.2d 610 (1950); Olivera v. Olivera, 305 Mass.
297, 25 N.E.2d 766 (1940); Albrect v. Pothoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934);
Morgan v. Leuck, 72 S.E.2d 825 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. 1952). See also, Minken v. Minken, 336
Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939), an action for the benefit of the child was allowed where the
mother as administrator sued herself for the death of the father.
36 Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859) ; Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 AtI.
292 (1925); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895).
37 Musmanno, J. dissenting in Parks v. Parks, supra note 15, at 305, 306, 135 A.2d
75, 76, "Countless pages in the law books are devoted to the description of pitched
battles between children and parents over wills, inheritances, settlements, partnerships,
real estate, personal property and business deals of every character."
3s Prosser, op. cit. supra note 9.
1962]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
REASONS FOR THE PARENTAL IMMUNITY RULE
One reason given for the parental immunity rule is that the
parent-child relationship is analagous to the relationship of husband
and wife. At common law the wife could not maintain an action for
personal injury against her husband. However, the common law while
considering the husband and wife to be one person, recognized the
parent and child as separate beings.39 The proceeds which the minor
would recover from his cause of action would be his own and not the
property of his parent. 0 The modern married women's acts have put
an end to the common law's conception of man and wife, but there
are no parallel acts in the case of parent and child. Thus, while some
jurisdictions permit a personal injury action by the wife against the
husband, they do not allow a child's action against his parent. 4' Thus,
the common law has always distinguished the parent-child and hus-
band-wife relationships, and this in itself negates the analogy made
in support of the parental privilege rule. However, the analogy ap-
pears even weaker when one considers that in modern jurisprudence
the idea that a wife may not maintain a personal injury action against
her spouse is considered an outmoded doctrine. Thus, to preclude the
infant's action on the basis of the analogy to husband and wife at com-
mon law seems inconsistent.
A make-weight argument sometimes advanced in favor of the
immunity rule is that the possibility of the tortfeasor inheriting the
proceeds which the minor would receive from his cause of action
should be avoided. When balanced against society's interest in com-
pensating those who are wrongfully injured, this argument cannot
stand, and the fact that the possibility of such inheritance would un-
doubtedly be remote in most cases weakens the argument even fur-
ther. If the infant is permitted to recover, he will be protected against
those dangers which confront him when recovery is denied. Thus, the
purposes of permitting recovery for the minor child would be ful-
filled during his life, and this is the best the law can do for any person
who is negligently injured. The possibility of the tortfeasor's inher-
itance of what is left of the child's damages after they have served
their purpose is not a sufficient reason for denying the child's action.
To assert otherwise would assume that danger lies in the possibility
39 McCurdy, "Torts Between Parent and Child," 5 Viii. L. Rev. 521, 523 (1960).
40 Wilton v. Middlesex R.R., 125 Mass. 130 (1878); Donahue v. Richards, 33 Me.
376 (1854).
41 Rambo v. Rambo, supra note 16; Mesite v. Kirchstein, supra note 16; Redding
v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wisc. 260, 212
N.W. 787 (1927).
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that parents will injure their own chlidren in the hope of a future
profit.
Another argument is that if the child's action were to be allowed,
the family funds could possibly be depleted at the expense of other
children in the family. Where, as in the case of automobile accidents,
any recovery permitted the child would most likely be covered by
liability insurance, this argument cannot stand. The argument can
only refer to those families which are not financially capable of meet-
ing the expenses caused by the infant's injuries. Thus, the family is
faced with the alternatives of not securing the proper medical services
for the injured child and thus not depriving the other children of their
share of family wealth, or securing the necessary services and de-
priving the other children. Permitting the injured child's action would
put an end to this dilemma. This would provide sufficient funds to care
for the injured infant and yet would not effect the other children.
The reason for the parental immunity rule traditionally relied
upon by the courts is that domestic tranquility and parental discipline
would be disrupted if the minor child were permitted to bring a per-
sonal injury action against his parent. This argument rests upon the
doubtful assumption that an uncompensated injury aids to the peace
of the home. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the argument has
weight when the infant's injury results from the exercise of an act of
parental discipline or control. The law recognizes that a reasonable act
of parental discipline is a defense to an intentional tort action brought
by the infant,42 and the rule seems sound when the child alleges negli-
gence in this situation. The reasoning that if a child could bring an
action in these situations, the parent would lose control over the in-
fant, and the youth would come to disrespect the disciplining parent
is acceptable. And, unless the parent has a comprehensive liability
policy, one cannot take the position that insurance negates the reason
for the rule. However, it cannot be logically contended that parental
control would be disturbed when the child's action is based upon
conduct by the parent which is not carried out in a parental capacity.
The courts have recognized this distinction in those cases where the
conduct which caused the injury occurred as a part of the parent's
vocational activities,4 3 but they have failed to carry this distinction
to its logical result. The act of driving an automobile is not an act of
parental control or discipline; instead, it is a mechanical act which is
42 Prosser, op. cit. supra, at § 27; A parent is permitted to use reasonable force
for the correction of a child providing the same is administered in good faith and in a
reasonable manner. The rule extends to one who stands in loco parentis to the child.
43 Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 8, Signs v. Signs, supra note 20; Worrell v.
Worrell, supra note 19; Borst v. Borst, supra note 13; Lusk v. Lusk, supra note 18.
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performed by parent and non-parent alike. Thus, one cannot contend
the parent would lose control over the infant if the action were al-
lowed and, as in the vocational tort cases, liability insurance is present.
Thus, on the basis of the reasons just discussed, the parental
privilege in automobile negligence cases seems outmoded, and it
would appear that the bench recognizes this logic. However, rather
than change the rule, the courts retreat to an argument that the
danger of collusion is so great in cases where the child sues his insured
parent that the action should be prohibited. In Hastings v. Hastings4
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
. . we all know that realistically such actions are never thought of,
let alone commenced, unless there is an insurance policy, automo-
bile or comprehensive personal liability ... on the basis of which
money can be sought to be obtained.45
Thus, the sole reason for denying recovery to the minor unemancipated
child in automobile negligence cases is the alleged danger of fraud
and collusion. But, the action is permitted when the parent is engaged
in a vocational activity, and in those cases we found that the presence
of liability insurance was a decisive argument for permitting re-
covery.46 It cannot honestly be argued that the danger of collusion
is greater in one case than the other. Furthermore, there is reason to
doubt that the danger of collusion is as great as the courts would
have us believe. Collusion is a crime and certainly this fact has a
deterrent effect upon any family contemplating a fraud on an in-
surance company, and
... as parents who seek to instill decent principles of integrity and
ethics in their offspring will readily realize, there would be greater
restrain and less danger of fraud and collusion between the minor
child and his parents than there would be between the parent and
his adult friends and relatives who admittedly may maintain actions
when injured by the parent's negligent operation of his auto-
mobile.47
Nevertheless, there is always a certain amount of danger in any case
where liability insurance is present, and the courts should be con-
stantly alert to this danger. But, it is another thing to say that there
should not be a remedy for an injured child because of the possibility
of fraud and collusion. The courts must deal with the possibility of
fraud so long as they are kept open and to deny recovery in one
4 Supra note 15.
45 Id. at 252, 163 A.2d 150.
46 Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 8; Worrell v. Worrell, supra note 19; Borst v.
Borst, supra note 13; Lusk v. Lusk, supra note 18.
47 Jacobs, J. dissenting in Hastings v. Hastings, supra note 15, at 257, 163 A.2d 153.
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singled out situation seems unjust. Certainly, the collusion argument
furnishes no just basis for precluding meritorious actions.
EFFECT OF LIABiLITy INSURANCE
It is uniformly held that insurance only covers legal liability and
does not create it.48 The courts have created the parental immunity
exception in tort law and have advanced the above reasons. Insurance
does eliminate the reasons for the rule in automobile negligence cases.
The domestic harmony of the family will not be disturbed because
the action is in reality between the infant and his parents insurance
company and not the child and his parent. In fact, domestic harmony
would seemingly be increased if there are sufficient funds available
to provide the necessary medical care which the child will need.4 9
The alleged danger of fraud and collusion would certainly be held in
check by alert insurance company attorneys who are in fact the de-
fenders of the action. A great flood of litigation would not result if
the rule were changed to permit recovery in the automobile negligence
cases because the likelihood of settlement in these cases is great. 0
The danger that actions would be brought where the parent is not
insured is indeed slight if one accepts the reasoning of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Hastings. The emergence of compulsory automobile
insurance laws only serves to reenforce this argument, for these laws
are evidence of a public policy which favors the compensation of auto-
mobile accident victims.
While some courts have recognized that there is a need for a
change in the parental immunity rule, they have chosen to wait for
legislative action rather than to take the initiative themselves.51 How-
ever,
48 Owens v. Auto. Mut. Indem. Co., supra note 15; Rambo v. Rambo, supra note
15; Lund v. Olsen, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N.W. 185 (1931); Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453,
263 S.W.2d 291 (1953); Rines v. Rines, 97 N.H. 55, 80 A.2d 497 (1951); Siembab v.
Siembab, supra note 22; Parks v. Parks, supra note 16; Fidelity Say. Bank v. Aulik,
252 Wisc. 602, 32 N.W.2d 613 (1948).
49 Musmanno, J. dissenting in Parks v. Parks, supra note 15, at 312, 135 A.2d 79,
"To say that a family relationship will be severed because an injured child is to receive
money to buy medicine, to employ doctors, to hire nurses, to rent a hospital bed, and
to do everything that science can do to restore vigor to a helpless frame and light to
the lantern of a darkened brain-is to say what is opposed to demonstrated phenomena,
contrary to common knowledge, ...and antagonistic to established reality based upon
love, reverence, and loyalty between parent and child. Why would a mother hate her
child because, through payment of insurance money, her beloved offspring may have a
chance to recover?"
GO James, "Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,"
57 Yale L.J. 549, 566 (1948).
1 Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954); Levesque v. Levesque, 99
N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954).
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The doctrine of parental immunity . ..was created by the
courts. It is especially for them to interpret and modify that doc-
trine to correspond with prevalent considerations of public policy
and social needs.52
That insurance has made an important impact upon the law of
negligence cannot be denied. 3 Accident litigation is no longer con-
sidered as a private contest between the parties but as a means of
adjustment between the parties with society being an interested
party.5 4 Society must be vitally interested in the restoration of a
child's health which has been lost because of an unfortunate accident
whether or not the person at fault is the infant's parent.
CONCLUSION
In the overwhelming majority of automobile cases, the law
acknowledges that the victim of negligence should be compensated. By
not extending this logic to those cases where a child is injured by his
parent's negligent operation of an automobile, the law exposes the
infant to unnecessary dangers. Even if his parents are financially able
to do what is necessary for his rehabilitation, there is a possibility
that their death will leave him in poor financial condition before he is
completely rehabilitated. If his injuries are permanent, he may well
become dependent upon society. The parents may be financially un-
able to care for the child, and he might permanently suffer from in-
juries which could have been remedied or the family may find it neces-
sary to borrow in order to pay for the child's medical bills. In the
latter case, the family harmony which the rule professes to protect may
well be disrupted for the family may come to resent the child because
of the additional expenses caused by his injuries. The child must be
protected if he has the misfortune to have parents who do not care
whether or not he is rehabilitated.
The rule of parental privilege does have a reasonable basis in
those cases where the parent has injured the child while exercising
reasonable parental control. To allow an action by the child in these
cases can only lead to a feeling of disrespect for the parent. In the
case of household accidents, it seems only fair that all in the family
share the common dangers. However, in the case of automobile ac-
cidents, the rule cannot be logically applied, and the courts should
assume the responsibility of modifying the rule of their own making.
JAmEs K. BROOKER
52 Nudd v. Matsoukas, supra note 22, at 619, 131 N.E.2d 531.
53 McNiece and Thornton, "Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete," 26 St. Johns L.
Rev. 255 (1952); James, supra note 50.
54 McNiece and Thornton, ibid.
